Business
Associations Class Notes
Let
us run through the cases. The early ones
are straightforward.
Bane v.
Here
we have non-qualified, unfunded pension plans for partners of law firms. They are becoming less common because they
tend to create a strain between the younger partners and the older, retired partners. Most law firms today just set up the H.R. 10
plan for the self-employed and encourage partners to contribute to it. This plan is not nearly as liberal as the
provisions under § 404 for a qualified pension plan. A partnership cannot have a qualified pension
plan, but a corporation can. If you want
the other fringe benefits like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, disability, or long term
care, you must go to a Sub C corporation.
There are a few law firms that do it, but it is more common physicians
for some reason. The question in the
case was the non-qualified plan provided that it ended when the firm
ended. The plaintiff was a retired who
had moved to
Partnership management
We
dealt with National Biscuit and Smith before.
Rouse v.
Pollard
Here
we had a very prestigious
Roach v. Mead
Here
we have different facts. This case cites
an earlier case of the Oregon Supreme Court, Croisant. The partnership
here was an accounting partnership. One
of the partnership’s clients was a wealthy businesswoman who planned to go to
The
facts of Roach itself are as follows:
there was a two person general partnership long before there were LLPs. One of the partners did some real estate
speculation on his own and lost his shirt.
One of his clients who he serviced was rich and the lawyer hit him up
for a personal loan. The check was made
out to the partner in his personal name.
The loan was never repaid, and that partner is judgment-proof. The client gets a different lawyer, of
course. Could the client sue the one
lawyer alone and get his partnership interest?
No, because §§ 15-38 of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 state that
an individual creditor of a partner can levy upon the partnership interest,
which allows a kind of weird remedy: a charging
order on his earnings from the partnership.
Shipman thinks this would include both a guaranteed salary and a share
of profits. He’s pretty sure that the
restrictions on wage garnishment would not apply because a partner’s earnings
or salary are not wages. This is
different than a share of stock: you can’t cause the interest to be paid over
and cause a dissolution. Furthermore,
the other partner or partners can redeem the partner’s interest. Shipman says that it’s not a great
remedy. Partnership or LLC interest is
basically not good collateral.
The
lawyer sued the partnership under §§ 1-18 and 40 saying that there was negligence in what the partner did, and that
the negligence led to the client’s loss.
He served both partners individually as well as the law firm. He claimed that the partnership itself was liable
as was the innocent partner. Negligence
was used to dig into the malpractice policy of the law firm. He claimed that what the lawyer did was negligence
only. What rules of professional ethics
were violated? Canon 5 and the rules thereunder
tell us that one of the stupidest things a lawyer can do is enter into personal
or financial relationships with clients.
It is clear that a lawyer must give all kinds of warnings of the dangers
of a personal loan to the client. Here,
the lawyer did not inform the client that he ought to insist on a first
mortgage on the lawyer’s house. The rule
is even stricter with trustees. The
court holds that the partnership and the other partner are on the hook.
Fiduciary duties of partners
to each other – Meinhard v. Salmon
This
is a partnership opportunity case. There
was a capitalist and sweat equity who get together around 1900. Sweat Equity is a real estate expert. Sweat Equity wants Capitalist to advance some
money. They plan to go 50-50 on
earnings. All the assets were put in
Sweat Equity’s name. Capitalist was a “secret partner” of the general
partnership. Most people think that
secret partners are just as liable as regular partners. Sub-partnership leads to the same result:
Smith is a general partner in a construction firm. He goes to his brother and he and the brother
enter into a sub-partnership in Smith’s share of the partnership. It is generally held that Smith’s brother
will be held liable just like any other general partner. Many lawyers in
Over
12-15 years there were rocky times, but Sweat Equity generally did well. The only problem was that Sweat Equity didn’t
have a lot of money. People who he’s
dealt with in real estate believe that he is the sole owner of the property. The partnership with the capitalist may have
been a handshake deal, and it wasn’t known by many people. Just before the end of the term of the partnership,
a third party proposed a massive redevelopment project for
Dissolution of the partnership
Read
§§ 14-38 carefully to understand dissolution.
Two of the key sections are §§ 31-32.
When you read them, you find a big split between two kinds of dissolution:
(1) rightful and (2) wrongful dissolution.
Fiduciary duties are very important in either case and can cause some
odd results. The first question is: can
you, by contract, create a partnership for a term that cannot be dissolved
during that term? In other words, can
you create a true agency coupled with an interest that is irrevocable? No, you definitely cannot. Another way to put it is that you can’t go
into court and get a mandatory injunction forcing people to stay with the partnership
if they want to leave.
Wrongful dissolution – Collins v. Lewis
This
case illustrates that there is such a thing as wrongful dissolution. If
there is a wrongful dissolution, two bad things happen to the wrongdoer: (1)
the bad guy loses all of his interest in the goodwill of the business and (2) he
is subject to an action for breach of contract by the other partners. In this case, Sweat Equity met with
Capitalist with the idea of building a big new cafeteria. Sweat Equity didn’t have any money, but he
had ideas and experience. Capitalist had
a lot of money. A deal like this today would
be set up in the LLC form and it would be malpractice per se for a lawyer not
to force the actors into this form. The
deal was that there was a partner’s salary for Sweat Equity because Sweat
Equity needed money to live on. The partnership
agreement said that during phase one, the building, no loss of the partnership
would be allocated to Sweat Equity. That’s
clearly legal and this type of agreement is a typical way to do it. In phase two, when the cafeteria starts
running, Sweat Equity’s salary continues, while all profits are allocated to Capitalist
until he has recovered all the losses that were allocated to him in phase
one. In phase three, the partnership
salary continues, but both profits and losses are equally distributed. At that point, Sweat Equity is bearing,
indirectly, one-half of the salary to him.
Capitalist
had good lawyers and a mortgage on Sweat Equity’s partnership interest as well
as many other legal protections.
Capitalist got mad and wanted to dissolve the partnership. When you read §§ 31-32, you find that if no
term is specified for a partnership, either party can get rightful dissolution at
any time. But that “out” is not
available to Capitalist. According to
several
The
special issues submitted to the jury were the following: (1) Can this business
be successfully carried on at a profit?
(2) If not, whose fault is it?
The jury found that the business could not be carried on at a profit and
that it was Capitalist’s fault. The trial
judge, based on these special issues, entered an order that there was no ground
for rightful dissolution. The case goes
to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, which affirms. Capitalist claims that there is no such thing
as a partnership that cannot be dissolved.
But the Court of Civil Appeals says that all the trial judge held was
that there were no grounds for rightful dissolution. He could still take a stab at wrongful dissolution, but the jury
findings in the case will be collateral estoppel and place all fault on the
Capitalist. Capitalist would lose his interest
in the goodwill of the business and would be liable in damages to Sweat Equity!
Cauble v.
Handler
This
is also a Texas Court of Civil Appeals case.
We have a 50-50 partnership between two partners in a profitable business. There is no partnership agreement except for the
agreement on the 50-50 split on profits and losses. One partner dies. He left all of his property to his
widow. The living partner loved the business
and wanted to keep it operating. The
bank signature cards allowed either partner to sign and thus there was no
practical problem with continuing the business.
What are the widow’s options at this point given the lack of a formal partnership
agreement except for the 50-50 split? Either
the widow or the living partner could force an immediate auction block sale of
the partnership’s assets. However, such
sales sacrifice value, so they are rarely used.
If the widow and living partner wanted to negotiate with the widow in
the place of the dead partner, they could do so, but the widow didn’t want to. The business could simply be continued, and if
the living partner treats the widow as a substitute for the dead partner and vice
versa, then under Blumer Brewing,
they will be considered 50-50 partners, with the widow taking the position of
her husband.
The
possibility that comes out here is that the living partner continues the business,
but the widow forces him to send out letters to everybody saying that the dead partner
is dead and that the living partner is continuing the business. This is done because you don’t want the widow
getting sued as an apparent partner. §
31-38 contemplates this possibility. The
Act says that she will not be liable as a partner. She has a creditor’s claim on the assets, but
that claim is subordinated to the regular old creditors of the partnership. This is true even if the old name is
continued (as is often the case with law firms). Within a reasonable time, the partnership
must pay off the widow with the value of the capital account. There are two big issues: (1) do we use book
value GAAP figures based on historical costs, or (2) do we use fair market
value figures? The court holds that in
the absence of an agreement (which would be binding under the Act), it was held
that fair market value would be used. The
ruling implies that goodwill will be computed and included in the equation
because a store that has been around for a long time creates goodwill. It may be different for lawyers.
The
case is troublesome in a way. The Texas Supreme
Court had a case called Mattie Carruth
Bird. She was the general partner in
a real estate limited partnership. Her
capital account had a negative balance.
How could this be? If you’re
using GAAP historical cost figures and you take out a second mortgage on real
estate and then distribute the proceeds to the partners, you’ll have negative
capital account balances. That doesn’t
mean the business is in trouble. The limited
partner sued to force her executor to pay into the capital account. The court interpreted the Uniform Partnership
Act of 1914 and Uniform Limited Partnership Act literally and agreed with the limited
partner. The second big holding was that
the executor of the deceased partner has the option to take interest from the
date of death until payoff, or if they elect to do so in a timely matter they
can get their share of profits for that period.
Early on, the lawyer made the correct election, because this was a very
profitable partnership. Note that under
§ 38, a partnership agreement providing for book value over two, three or four
years would prevail over §§ 31-38. The
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 are default provisions that
can be trumped by an agreement to the contrary.