Civil Procedure Class Notes
We
spent yesterday with Mas. We learned that, at least in certain
circumstances, the statute (28 U.S.C. § 1332) provides
for diversity jurisdiction, while in others, it provides some roadblocks.
The
case of Jean-Paul v. Peeper was simple.
But if we add Judy, and she comes from
Note
that this rule is not constitutional.
It is purely statutory and thus can be adjusted by other statutes. For example, the Federal Interpleader Act
requires only minimum diversity of the parties in order for federal courts
to have jurisdiction.
Hypotheticals
Dude
from
Guy
from
Dudes
from
Dudes
from
This
case seems to have more than its fair share of complexities. It involves not just § 1332, but
interpretation of that statute and splits between Circuits in such
interpretation.
What’s
happening in this case? Farouki’s a businessman who
borrowed money from Saadeh and defaulted on his loan. When the suit was filed, Saadeh was Greek and
Farouki was a permanent resident of the
Saadeh
sues Farouki in federal district court in D.C.
The theory is that the federal courts will have diversity jurisdiction. However, look back at the hypothetical we did
earlier. Isn’t it true that we don’t
allow an alien to sue another alien in our federal courts? What’s different here? Farouki is a permanent resident.
Saadeh
relies upon the plain meaning of the last sentence of § 1332(a), which says:
“For purposes of this section…an alien admitted to
the
So
we end up with a citizen of
Farouki,
however, argues that there is no jurisdiction.
The district court denied his motion, and Saadeh won on the merits. Farouki appeals on the merits of the case.
The
court itself (sua sponte) raises the jurisdictional question and asked
for briefs on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The court ultimately concludes that there is
no subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. There is something fishy about that
last sentence: it seemed to apply, but now something is amiss.
If
Saadeh’s case is dismissed, what can he do?
He could refile in federal court because Farouki is now a
What
does the court examine in rejecting the plain language of § 1332(a)? What is it about this section that troubles
the D.C. Circuit? If we just sort of
read it, it seems pretty clear. The D.C.
Circuit is going to tell us that it doesn’t mean what we think it means.
Are
there other doctrines that the D.C. Circuit is concerned about? The court claims that there is a “formidable constitutional
difficulty”. What is it? The court is concerned that the Constitution does
not allow suits between two foreign litigants.
What
is illustrated in this case is a clear, modern example of the textualist v.
pragmatist debate. Textualists say you
should use the plain language of the statute and only use what the statute says. Pragmatists say that you should weigh the
result of the statute as well as the legislative history and intent.
The
court looks at the intent of the sentence in question and finds that the
purpose was to “pour people out of court”.
Therefore, the court says that we should only apply the plain language
of the sentence if it will work to limit the scope of diversity jurisdiction.
Guy
from
What
Judge Rogers does is sort of add an interpretive caveat: the sentence applies
exactly when it will limit diversity jurisdiction.
Different
circuits have taken different positions on the interpretation of this statute. The Supreme Court doesn’t care much, because
the situation of Saadeh doesn’t happen
much.
“The
joy of getting cases reversed is that you get another bite at the apple.”
Maybe
it wasn’t as complicated as we initially thought it was!
At
the end of the case, Yeazell gives us a note on amount in controversy. All the stuff in § 1332 is predicated by the
requirement that the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. This amount has changed over time to
(somewhat) keep pace with inflation. It
started out at $500 and was most recently raised from $50,000 to $75,000 in
1997. What is the purpose of increasing
the amount in controversy? This will
limit the federal caseload.
The
court is pretty liberal towards plaintiffs in checking their pleading for a
sufficient amount in controversy.
There
are two issues here:
1. Injunctions
2. Aggregation
Tomorrow:
a bit more on amount in controversy, followed by supplemental jurisdiction and Gibbs.