Contracts
Class Notes
There’s
a two-year lease from April 1931 to May 1933 to rent space for a women’s
clothing store. Blumenthal promises to
pay $175 per month for the first year and $200 a month for the second
year. At the end of the first year, the defendant
tenant talks to the plaintiff landlord and says the economy’s bad and the defendant
is going to have to quit unless the plaintiff will take $175 per month for the
second year, too. There was some factual
controversy. The trial court held that
the landlord promised to take the $175 in full satisfaction of the
promise. Later, the plaintiff sued for
the $25 per month plus the last month’s rest, and he got what he asked
for. The trial court refused to enforce
the landlord’s promise to take $175 instead of $200. If the landlord’s promise had been
enforced, he would have only gotten $175 for the last month.
The
court takes the amended agreement to be a good faith modification of the contract. Why does the court refuse to enforce this
modification? There is no consideration
for the landlord’s promise. Paying the
rent that the tenants were already bound to pay isn’t consideration.
The
legal duty rule
This
is also known as the “preexisting legal duty rule” or “preexisting duty rule”. What was the tenant’s duty? It was to pay the $175,
in fact, the duty was to pay more: $200 a month. It follows that the tenant suffered no
detriment as a result of his promise to pay $175. The tenant was already bound to perform
under the preexisting contract. When you
think about it in those terms, the landlord got nothing in exchange for
his promise. We will not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration, but you have to get something for
your promise, or on consideration grounds it will be unenforceable.
“A
promise to do what the promisor is already legally bound to do is an unreal consideration.”
One
of the things this case is about is debtor pressure on creditors. Creditors are frequently in need of the money
that is owed them. It’s expensive and it’s
a hassle to have to sue and work hard to collect on your debts. Shall we allow debtors to haggle creditors
down by threatening them with the possibility of having to go to court? No way!
The
doctrine of Levine is useful for
preventing debtors from sort of blackmailing creditors. This doctrine has been modified and sort of
watered-down since.
How
could the agreement be made enforceable here?
You just need to have some consideration, no matter how small. For example, Blumenthal might have given
Levine some clothing as additional consideration, or he could have made his
payments earlier than the parties had previously agreed. If you throw something into the deal that you
weren’t under a preexisting legal duty to deliver, you can make your amended
agreement enforceable.
This
is kind of tricky because this is the sort of think that a lawyer would think
of but ordinary folks would never think of.
It’s sneaky.
How
do we distinguish this case from Fried v. Fisher? Fisher relied on the promise. He went out of the flower business and got
into the restaurant business. That’s
huge reliance.
On
the other hand, Blumenthal didn’t do anything different after the promise than
he did before the promise. There was no
palpable change in position. Blumenthal
will argue that the reliance was not going out of business, but we would
be forced to take his word for it. A
bigger reason is that to enforce on the basis of reliance we need detrimental
reliance; a situation where justice requires enforcement. There is nothing detrimental about Blumenthal’s
reliance because he was under a preexisting legal duty to pay the rent. Justice doesn’t require any enforcement for
this guy.
The
Restatement on the preexisting legal duty rule
The
commentary to Restatement § 73 (which states the preexisting duty rule) says
even when there is no consideration on account of the preexisting legal duty
rule, promissory estoppel can form a basis for enforcement in appropriate
situations.
What’s
the connection between this and Duncan v. Black? In Restatement terms, when does § 73 apply as
opposed to § 74 (1)?
§
74(1) deals with creditor pressure as opposed to debtor
pressure. Someone asserts a claim
against you (“pay me or I’ll sue”), and in response to that threat you promise
to pay them to settle the claim. If the
claim was made in good faith, we will uphold the settlement agreement.
§
73 deals with debtor pressure (“I’m going to pay you less than I owe”). I threaten to default in order to get you to
take only part of the debt to satisfy that debt.
The
preexisting legal duty rule operates with respect to liquidated debts,
but not in respect to non-liquated debts. What’s liquidated debt? It means a debt that is undisputed as to both
liability and amount. When
there is a good faith dispute as to either liability or amount, the preexisting
legal duty rule doesn’t operate.
That
is to say, when we disagree about whether I really owe you anything, or we
disagree about how much I owe you, the matter is ripe for compromise or
settlement and we’ll enforce agreements to that effect.
However,
your promise to take less than 100% in satisfaction of my debt (that we both
agree upon), without more, will be assumed unenforceable.
How
does the court get around this? They
will not judge the adequacy of consideration.
Statutory
modification of the preexisting legal duty rule
Also,
the preexisting legal duty rule may be changed by statute. In
When
you make the contract for the sale of goods, you need consideration. Once the contract is made, however, it can be
changed without any further consideration.
For example, the buyer can agree to pay more than the agreed price or
the seller can agree to sell for less than the agreed price. This can be done without any consideration
under the UCC.
In
the comments, the text is construed to mean that modifications must be made in
good faith: UCC § 1-203 says that all contracts impose the obligation of good
faith. Therefore, you can’t modify a contract
in bad faith (with extortion or coercion or duress).
You
can abolish the preexisting legal duty rule, but as soon as you do, you must
substitute something else in its stead.
What you substitute it with might do a much better job of protecting the
interests we’re trying to protect.
There
is more to read about this on pages 561-573.
In
the commentary of Restatement § 73, it is suggested that when the only consideration
for a promise is something you already owed, you probably have a situation of
bad faith anyway. If you use the preexisting
legal duty rule, you don’t have to inquire into whether the promise was made
under duress. This rule is a cheaper,
faster solution than the more contemporary UCC § 2-209 approach.
Notice
the differences in the statutory approaches to the preexisting legal duty rule:
Unilateral
versus bilateral contracts
A
unilateral contract is one where only one party has made a promise. That is, a promise has been exchanged for performance. This is the older kind of contract that was
common in the olden days. For example, when
you promise a reward for finding a lost dog, you won’t take a promise to find
the dog in exchange for the money. You’ll
only take the dog itself in exchange for the promise of money (and then
the money).
A
bilateral contract is one where a promise is exchanged for a promise. This is now the most common type of contract. The parties will bargain not only for a
promise, but also for performance.
Betsey
wants to buy Sam’s sailboat. They sign a
written agreement in which Betsey promises to pay $5,000 for the boat and Sam
promises to “sell the boat or not”.
Say
Sam repudiates. Can Betsey recover damages? No, because Sam didn’t make a promise. He made an “illusory promise”. Another way to say it is that Sam is not in breach
because he didn’t make a promise that it is possible to breach. Sam said, “Either I’ll sell you the boat for
$5,000, or I won’t. My
choice.” Sam has not chosen to
restrict his freedom of action at all.
A
useful definition of an illusory promise is that it is a promise that is
impossible to break.
In
To
the extent that a promise is illusory, you can’t hold someone to it.
Go
back to the hypothetical and say Betsey backs out. Will Sam have a cause of action for breach of
contract against Betsey if he can prove that the market price of the boat is
lower than the contract price? Does an
illusory promise constitute consideration for Betsey’s promise? No.
Betsey’s promise is unenforceable because it’s not supported by consideration. Betsey got nothing in exchange for her
promise. All she got was a non-promise.
Another
name for all this is “mutuality of obligation”.