Criminal
Law Class Notes
Navarro
took some wooden beams, mistakenly believing they were abandoned. This is a common claim made by defendants: a mistake
of fact.
Navarro
wants a certain jury instruction that basically says if he made a good faith
mistake he should be acquitted, even if it was entirely unreasonable. The judge did not accept this jury
instruction, but rather told the jury to acquit only if the mistake was
reasonable.
The
appellate court says that the defendant’s instruction was correct.
If
the belief was unreasonable, did he act in a morally culpable manner? We would more or less be saying he was
negligent. There would be a mens rea,
and thus some level of culpability.
Why did the court reverse the verdict?
He lacked the specific intent required for the crime. Moral culpability is general intent.
What
would Model Penal Code § 2.04 say about this case? It says either the mistake does or does not
negate the required mens rea for the crime. If the mens rea is the “intent” or “purpose”
to steal, and the mistake proves that the defendant did not have such a
purpose, then the defendant must be acquitted.
The Model Penal Code rules!
“Mistake
of fact” is not a true affirmative defense.
It is really a challenge to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of mens
rea.
The
handout on mistake of fact analysis
The
first thing to do when you’re in a non-Model Penal Code jurisdiction is to ask:
is it a general intent, specific intent, or strict liability crime? If it’s strict liability, you’re done. Intent doesn’t matter, and thus mistake doesn’t
matter.
If
you have a specific intent crime, you ask if the mistake relates to the specific
intent portion of the crime. In the case
of Navarro, his mistake directly relates to his intent to steal. This being the case, we use the so-called “elemental”
analysis. Does Navarro’s mistake of fact
negate the specific intent element of the offense? In this case, we may well argue that it does.
If
you have a general intent crime, then at common law you must apply a “culpability”
analysis. You must ask whether the defendant’s
state of mind was blameworthy, and in particular you must ask whether or not
their mistake, and in turn their behavior, was reasonable.
This
is complicated!!! The Model Penal Code
is better, Dressler thinks! In the Model
Penal Code, you always apply “elemental” analysis.
Regina
v. Prince and the “moral wrong” doctrine
Prince
believed the girl he was taking away was 18, but she was really 14. The jury found that his mistake was
reasonable.
The
court takes the offense to be a general intent crime. A reasonable mistake means there is no
culpability. However, the conviction was
upheld. Why? Taking an 18 year old away from her parents
was considered immoral.
When
you use the “moral wrong” doctrine, you look at the world through the eyes of
the defendant and assume the facts as the defendant himself understood
them. This doctrine says that if the defendant
acted immorally, it is reasonable for him to assume the risk that the
circumstances are different from what he thinks they are and thus be found
guilty of some crime. Here, we end up
asking: are you a bad guy? The answer
turns out to be yes, even though there is a reasonable mistake of fact.
Many
jurisdictions do not apply this doctrine anymore. It is a position that some jurisdictions
still do use. What’s wrong with this
doctrine?
One
issue is: how do we determine that certain conduct is immoral? Basically, judges will decide. In
The
other problem is the principle of legality.
If it’s so wrong to take an 18-year-old away from her parents, make it a
crime! There’s a lack of notice and the
risk of the court creating crimes.
We
do not live in a world where everything that is immoral is illegal. There are lots of things that people do that
are immoral that are not a crime. It is
up to the legislature to draw a line between the illegal and the merely
immoral.
This
is a very controversial doctrine, but it’s out there, and sometimes it “bites
you” when you least expect it.
Hypothetical:
battery upon a police officer
Say
you apply the “moral wrong” doctrine to this situation. Is it morally wrong for someone to push
someone they believe is attacking her?
No, so under this doctrine she is acquitted because through her eyes,
she was acting in self-defense.
Hypothetical:
transportation of minors across state lines for prostitution
The
“legal wrong” doctrine is basically the “moral wrong” doctrine with the word “legally”
substituted for the word “morally”.
Under common law doctrine, the defendant would assume the risk that the
facts were not as he believed them to be, and be found guilty of a more serious
crime. It can be argued that this is
unjust, because he may be convicted of a crime that requires a higher mens
rea than he has.
Under
the Model Penal Code, he will be convicted of the lesser crime.
It’s
crucial at common law to distinguish between general intent, specific intent,
and strict liability. However, sometimes
courts will fall back on the “moral wrong” or “legal wrong” doctrines when
dealing with a general intent crime committed under a reasonable mistake of
fact.
People v. Marrero and mistake of law
How
did this case get to the Court of Appeals of
The
defendant was under the impression that he was exempt from a firearms law
because he believed he was a “peace officer” under the definition in the statute. The trial court dismissed the indictment, but
the state appeals court reinstated the indictment.
Six
judges interpreted the statute. Three
felt that
What
do we learn from the case is the common law rule when a person claims a mistake
of law? The common law says that “Ignorance
of the law is no defense.” We probably
all learned this in elementary school.
This
case is not applying common law; it is applying a statute.
What
is the rationale for such a harsh rule?
They claim, as does Holmes, that admitting the excuse of mistake of law
encourages ignorance of the law. This is
a classic utilitarian
statement. We’re willing to concede that
this individual does not deserve punishment, yet our interest in persuading
people to learn the law outweighs that individual’s interests.
The
dissent takes a retributivist
stance. Hancock says we mustn’t punish
someone whose mistake of law is reasonable, because that person is not
blameworthy.
The
Holmes position is the classic explanation for the common law rule that
ignorance is no defense. However, there
is a utilitarian argument for why the maxim is wrong.
If
ignorance will never get us off, we have no incentive to learn the law. However, if we make a reasonable effort to
learn the law and are thus given a defense, we have a good incentive.
The
Model Penal Code approach
§
2.02(9) does not ordinarily require proof that a defendant
knew that a law existed or understood it.
§
2.04(1) creates an exception to that general proposition. If the definition of the crime itself
requires knowledge of the law and you didn’t know it, then you lack one of the
necessary elements for the offense.
§
2.04(3) provides a limited set of circumstances in
which even though knowledge of the law isn’t an element of the crime, we allow
a defense. We don’t allow a defense
based on a personal misunderstanding of the law, but rather a reasonable
reliance on an official statement of the law from a public official or some
other source. A casual or unofficial interpretation
of the law from a public official is no good.
How
does a person get an official interpretation of the law in the real world? You request (probably through your attorney) an
“interpretive letter” from the Attorney General of your state. These letters can be found in bound volumes
in your local law library. As long as
you reasonably rely on these letters, they can’t come after you. This defense is very, very narrow.
Basically,
we do not give people a defense from a mistake of law, except for
very few special cases where they made a reasonable mistake based on an official
statement of the law.
There
are a few other exceptions.
Next
time, we will look at the last note in Marrero.