Barber
v. Superior Court
147
Cal.App.3d 1006, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484.
Dressler,
p. 124-128
Facts: The deceased went into a
vegetative state. The family asked the
doctors to take him off life support.
They did. The state charged the
doctors with murder. A magistrate
dismissed the charges, but the Superior Court reinstated them. The doctors filed writs of prohibition which
were considered by the Court of Appeal.
Issue: Can a doctor be tried for
murder for taking a patient off life support with the family’s consent?
Rule: Life sustaining treatment
must be continued when it is proportionate.
In other words, the treatment must be continued so long as the benefits
exceed the costs.
Analysis: The court says the main
question is whether the omission (no longer providing life sustaining care) was
lawful. The omission was lawful
if there was no legal duty to act. There
is no duty to act if the prescribed course of treatment has been shown to be
ineffective. In this case, the treatment
is ineffective because the patient will never recover substantial brain
function.
Conclusion: The court found for the appellants
and determined they must not be tried for murder.
Notes
and Questions
1. Leavens turns
it around and says that treatment equals non-action, while non-treatment equals
action.
2. The court
ruled that withholding an injection is an omission, therefore providing
an injection would be an act and not an omission. On the other hand, failing to provide insulin
would be an omission, but could well be a breach of a legal duty, and therefore
the doctor could be liable for the death of the patient. The actions or omissions of the doctors in Barber
were different than the others mentioned because the family approved of the
doctors’ actions and gave written consent.
3. I would think
that the homeowner acted by closing the door.
The door would have remained open if the homeowner had not acted to
close it. In terms of morality, I think
the answer doesn’t matter, however, legally, it would be more likely the
homeowner could be held liable for actively closing a door than passively not
opening a door. We punish omissions far
more rarely than actions, and the standard for punishing an omission is higher
than that for punishing an action. In
the case of John and Mary, common sense dictates that action and non-action are
morally equivalent, and Aaron should in no way be held responsible for either. Claiming otherwise would implicit assert that
John’s life is worth more than Mary’s or vice versa.
4. Even though
the presence or absence of a certain defense should not affect the court’s
ruling on the law, it might have. I
think the court didn’t want the defendants to be tried. The court might have gone a different way on
the law if the defendants had some other defense. The constitutional right to die is not
decided here.