Owens v. State
Court of Special Appeals of
93 Md.App. 162, 611 A.2d 1043.
Dressler, p. 14-17.
Facts: Owens was found by a state trooper passed out drunk
in his truck with the lights on and the motor running. He was found guilty of driving while
intoxicated. He appealed on the basis
that the evidence provided at trial was not sufficient to convict him.
Issue: Are the circumstances of the case inconsistent with
any reasonable hypothesis of innocence?
Rule: “[A] conviction on circumstantial evidence alone
is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”
Analysis: The court reasons that there are only two reasonable
conclusions that can be drawn from the scene that the state trooper discovered.
1.
The
defendant had just finished driving drunk.
2.
The
defendant was about to drive drunk.
The first conclusion would result
in finding the defendant guilty, while the second conclusion would result in
finding the defendant innocent.
The court argues that in
order for Owens to be found guilty, there must be some factor that makes the
first conclusion more likely.
The court finds some
difficulty because very little evidence was presented in the case. For example, the court cannot consider the
fact that Owens’s driver’s license lists his address as a different address
than the one of the driveway at which he was found. This was not introduced as evidence at trial,
so the court can’t look at it on appeal.
The court presents facts that
it says give weight to the first conclusion:
1.
The
defendant was on at least his third beer.
Thus, it is argued, it’s more likely he was near the end of his drinking
than the beginning of his drinking.
2.
The
defendant was unconscious when found by the trooper. This is further evidence that he had been
drinking for some time.
3.
Somebody
called in a report of a suspicious vehicle.
Presumably, they wouldn’t have done this if the vehicle had been parked
in a private driveway at the time.
Conclusion: The court affirmed the conviction.
Notes and Questions
1.
In
the absence of specific instructions, I think I would have voted to convict
based on the logic that he either did it or didn’t do it, and if it’s
impossible that he didn’t do it, he must have done it. But let’s consider the various sets of jury
instructions.
a.
Moral
Certainty – With these
instructions, I would convict, because I would feel that though I experience possible
doubt, I don’t experience reasonable doubt.
b.
Firmly
Convinced – On these
instructions, assuming I followed them, I may vote to acquit because I am
unsure whether I am “firmly convinced”.
I think I would also have to concede that there is a “real possibility”
the defendant is not guilty.
c.
No
Waver or Vacillation – I find
myself wavering in my conviction of guilt, but then again, maybe I only waver while
I’m considering the evidence rather than after I considered the
evidence. Also, my doubts seem rather
“speculative” or merely “possible”. It
would be close, but I think I would vote to convict.
d.
No
Hesitation – the language
about being “willing to rely and act upon [the proof of guilt] without
hesitation” in my own affairs would sway me to vote to convict. I’m personally satisfied from the evidence
presented that the defendant is guilty to the point that I would stake
something of my own interests on my belief.
2.
This
sounds suspiciously like “preponderance of the evidence” rather than “beyond a
reasonable doubt” to me. However, it
seems as though it may be in line with the court’s logic overall. If conviction cannot be sustained on
circumstantial evidence alone unless there is no reasonable hypothesis of
innocence, then if you show the only possible hypothesis is not reasonable, you
can sustain a conviction. But I
think there may be a subtle logical fallacy here: the rule doesn’t say that you
must convict if there’s no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It only says that you must not sustain
a conviction based on circumstantial evidence where there is a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
court could have still overturned this verdict on the grounds that the hypothesis
consistent with guilt was not proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
3.
Dressler
covers the circumstances under which a judge may grant a motion for a directed
verdict. This is how the trial judge
makes sure the presumption of innocence is enforced.
4.
If
we assume that the trial court resolved the conflict between the two hypotheses
in favor of the prosecution, it is actually easier to affirm the conviction,
because we don’t need to say that the verdict was correct “beyond a reasonable
doubt”, but only that “a rational trier of fact could reasonably have reached
the result that it did”.