Yeazell, p. 77-84
[Special note for anxious 1Ls: Reading and briefing this case is a hazing exercise more than anything else. The current law of personal jurisdiction mostly comes from cases you'll study later (like Shoe and Shaffer). Also, most of the cases you'll read won't use such archaic language. So hang in there! Thanks for visiting!]
Facts: Oh man, here we go…there are these three guys:
Mitchell – Mitchell was an
attorney who lived in
Neff – who didn’t live in
Pennoyer – who got a
sheriff’s deed. The sheriff took the
money and gave it to Mitchell.
Now, Neff “reappeared”…I
don’t know where, but it seems to imply that he returned to Oregon and found
out his land had been sold seemingly under his feet (in his absence). So Neff sued Pennoyer to get the land. Neff was all like, “I’ve got this deed from
the government, dude!” And Pennoyer was
like “Sheriff’s deed! Read ‘em and
weep!”
Procedural Posture: Neff sued Pennoyer [thanks to Ashley from U. Miami for spotting the prior error] in federal court, where the lower
court found for Neff due to problems in the way the order of publication was
obtained and how the publication was proved.
The case went to the Supreme Court on appeal from Pennoyer.
Issues: Definitely issues as opposed to issue.
1.
Is
constructive service by publication legal?
2.
Does
the state of Oregon have jurisdiction in personam over Neff?
3.
Does
the state of Oregon have jurisdiction in rem over Neff, or Neff’s stuff?
1.
Was
it appropriate to sell the property before it was attached (seized)?
2.
If
the first lawsuit cannot be upheld, does the sale of the property to Pennoyer
count?
But:
Main Issue: Was it legal for the state of Oregon to register a
judgment against Neff without personal service of process?
Rules:
1.
A
state has exclusive jurisdiction over people and property within its borders.
2.
No state
can exercise jurisdiction over people or property in other states.
3.
Judgments
in personam without personal service of process shall not be upheld.
4.
Judgments
in rem with only constructive service may be upheld.
5.
The
“Full Faith and Credit” clause of the Constitution only applies “when the court
rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject-matter”.
Analysis: The newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment[1]
lets the court question “judgments rendered against non-residents without personal
service of process” on a new and different basis: you can’t debate somebody’s
rights and duties in a court that doesn’t have jurisdiction over them, because
that violates due process of law.
Conclusion: The original verdict of Mitchell v. Neff was
invalid because the state of Oregon did not have jurisdiction in personam
over Neff. Therefore, the judgment
shouldn’t have happened and the property should have never been sold. Consequently, the court upheld the decision
in Neff’s favor.
Dicta: The court tries to clarify a bunch of stuff to make
sure the ruling isn’t applied in ways they don’t want it applied. From Steve we get the idea that the court
wants states to be able to declare one of their own residents divorced even if
the spouse runs off to another state and doesn’t appear for divorce
proceedings. In other words, if I’m a
citizen of Oregon and I’m married to Mrs. Shecket and Mrs. Shecket runs off to
Ohio, the state of Oregon can declare me officially divorced and not married to
Mrs. Shecket, even in her absence and even without personal service of process.
The court also wants the
states to be able to force people or companies to have an agent in the state
who can take personal service of process.
As history progresses, this (I think) ends up being kind of
onerous. But overall, the court just
seems to say that they want states to be able to continue to regulate business
within their own borders.
Terms to look up
In personam
In rem
Comity
Notes and Questions
1.
a.
We can
only suppose that Neff first became aware of the judgment when he realized that
Pennoyer had the land that Neff thought was his own. Otherwise, we’re not told when or if Neff was
aware of the judgment against him.
b.
What
do we mean by a “telling objection”? Are
we asking if constructive service of process is always inadequate? Actually, the court seems to say that Oregon
state law says it’s inadequate unless the defendant owns property in
Oregon. That makes you wonder how the
first judgment slipped past.
c.
The
court discussed the objection when it talked about the specifics of Oregon’s
statutes on constructive service of process.
2.
The
state court could have entered a judgment against Neff if he had either
(1) been a resident of Oregon, (2) had voluntarily appeared in Oregon to
receive personal service of process, or (3) had owned property in Oregon at the
time of the original lawsuit.
3.
Steve
says the distinction between power in personam and power in rem
doesn’t hold up today.
a.
The
Oregon court didn’t obtain in personam jurisdiction over Neff because he
wasn’t personally served with process in Oregon. He was a non-resident of Oregon and never
showed up when he got sued.
b.
The
Oregon court didn’t obtain in rem jurisdiction over Neff because he
didn’t own any property in Oregon at the time of the lawsuit. He didn’t own the 300 acres until later.
4.
The
three sections of the opinion
a.
Just
the facts; make sure you know them.
b.
The
principles of personal jurisdiction (this is where these principles first
originate)
i.
Mitchell
v. Neff failed to achieve
either in personam or in rem jurisdiction.
ii.
In
personam and in rem are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
c.
Here’s
the dicta. The court clarifies and
narrows some of its statements.
5.
Perhaps
the court is arguing that even though the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified
until 1868 it reflected common law at that time. The Fourteenth Amendment also seems to simply
restate the Fifth Amendment. I’m not
sure what was new in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The text suggests that this amendment was “revolutionary”, and if it
didn’t apply in 1866, it could be argued the court is applying it
inappropriately in this case.
6.
The
ruling in Pennoyer claims it is based on the Constitution. Collateral attack applied to Neff in Pennoyer
because Neff wasn’t subject to personal jurisdiction in Oregon and never showed
up in Oregon during Mitchell’s lawsuit.
By not showing up, Neff was able to keep that judgment from being valid
and he was able to get back his land when he sued Pennoyer.
7.
A
is a resident of Minnesota and B is a resident of North Dakota. B owns some land in Minnesota. A sues B in Minnesota.
a.
Because
“the laws of one State have no operation outside its territory”, A cannot
personally serve B in North Dakota to appear in Minnesota. The court in Minnesota doesn’t have
jurisdiction in personam.
b.
This
appears to be collateral attack. B’s
appearance in North Dakota doesn’t retroactively give the Minnesota court
jurisdiction in personam.
c.
The
state of Minnesota has the authority to serve personal process to B when B is
within its borders. Once B has received
process, the state of Minnesota has jurisdiction in personam over B.
d.
Here
the original proceeding in Minnesota is valid, i.e. Minnesota did have
jurisdiction in personam, and under the Full Faith and Credit clause
North Dakota must enforce the judgment upon B.
e.
If
A attaches B’s land before suing B, then Minnesota has jurisdiction in rem over
B. B need not be served with personal
process in this case, and so A prevails.
f.
If
A does not attach B’s land first, Minnesota lacks jurisdiction in rem
and so the original judgment is invalid and B prevails.
g.
The
court made a specific exception in Pennoyer just for this case. The court said that Minnesota has the
authority to say whether or not A is married.
I guess in theory North Dakota could consider B still married to A even
as Minnesota considers A divorced from B.
h.
Under
the rule in Pennoyer, it would seem that Minnesota doesn’t have
jurisdiction in personam to get B to pay A alimony and child support.
i.
Whether
B was in Minnesota or Wisconsin at the time she was served process is a
question of fact, not a question of law.
If B was in Wisconsin, then the original judgment is invalid. If B was in Minnesota, the original judgment is
valid. I think the court in North
Dakota must determine where B was and then rule on whether Minnesota had
jurisdiction in personam.
8.
Okay! Colorful characters are good.
9.
Pennoyer’s conceptual scheme:
a.
Power:
if a court has in personam jurisdiction, it has the power to take money
or impose an injunction on the defendant.
If the court has in rem jurisdiction, it has the power to decide
that someone else owns the defendant’s property. If you use the land for other purposes or
take jurisdiction over other kinds of property, it’s called quasi in rem.
b.
Consent:
You might be subject to a state’s jurisdiction, even if you don’t own
property in that state and you’re not a resident, if you give consent
to it. For example, the state can force
non-residents to appoint an agent in the state who can accept service of
process. This would allow a state to get
jurisdiction over lots of nonresidents in return for letting them do business
in the state. This is how states get
jurisdiction over corporations doing business within their borders. However, if you’re talking about individuals,
the Constitution protects their right to go between states and do business
wherever they want. Can a state demand
someone to consent to jurisdiction to be able to do something that’s their
constitutional right anyway? Sounds like
no.
c.
Notice:
The “concealed strand”…hmmmm. Notice by
personal service in required for in personam jurisdiction, but not
required for in rem jurisdiction.
If the person is within your borders you can personally serve them process
and have power over them. Apparently,
the court goes all wrong, according to Steve, when it talks about in rem
jurisdiction. The problem is that courts
upheld pretty lame notice when the matter was considered in rem.
10. Pennoyer could be considered outdated given modern
advancements in transportation and communications. To bring Pennoyer up-to-date, the
Supreme Court kept using the concepts of consent and presence.
a.
Consent
i.
Corporations
can be served process in their state of incorporation, and states can establish
requirements under which corporations can do business within their borders, and
in particular that states can require consent to jurisdiction.
ii.
With
persons, it wasn’t so clear. There
emerged something called implied consent.
b.
Presence
i.
Corporations
don’t have a physical existence, so how can you serve them process? The first solution was given by Bank of
Augusta v. Earle.
ii.
Courts
later defined presence for corporations as sustaining a certain level of
activity in a state.