State v. Linscott
Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine, 1987.
520 A.2d 1067.
Dressler, pp. 859-861
Facts: The defendant and some other people went to rob a
coke dealer. One of the other people
brought a gun, and when they busted into the place, the guy shot the coke
dealer and killed him. The defendant
didn’t intend to kill anyone, but was found guilty of murder and robbery. The defendant appealed on the basis that the
accomplice liability statute was unconstitutional because it could convict him
of murder, which requires the mens rea of intent (purpose) or knowledge, just
by showing he was negligent.
Issue: Is the “foreseeable consequence” rule constitutional?
Rule: The accomplice liability statute in
Analysis: The court doesn’t see a problem with the current
construction of the rule.
Conclusion: The conviction is upheld.
Notes and Questions
1.
So
to conflict under the “foreseeable consequence” rule, you must find:
a.
The
primary person did the primary crime.
b.
The
secondary person helped the primary person commit that crime.
c.
The
primary person committed another crime.
d.
That
other crime was a “foreseeable consequence” of the primary crime.
2.
It
doesn’t matter, because someone’s death is arguably a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of any of those encouraged acts.
3.
This
isn’t quite right. Using words to
encourage someone to commit a robbery, for example, can’t possibly in itself
lead to murder, but the robbery that might ensue might lead to murder.
4.
The
Pinkerton doctrine talks about the natural and probable consequences of
an agreement, rather than of a crime. The Pinkerton doctrine seems broader.
5.
I
think the death of one of the participants of a staged accident is reasonably
foreseeable. The lawyer also encouraged
it. Sure, I’d say you can convict the
lawyer. This doctrine seems pretty
broad.