Legislation
Class Notes
Chalkboard notes
§ 441a(d)
political parties can make expenditures “in connection with general
election campaign of federal candidates”
(d)(3) Limit on coord. Exp is $20,000 or “2 cents times voting age
population of State” (e.g.
Get
ready to type as fast as possible!!!
Fast, fast, fast, fast, fast, fast!!!!!!!
We
were talking yesterday about Nixon. There has been considerable inflation since
1974. The limits upheld in Buckley are now worth much less in real
terms. If it was indexed for inflation
in the 1974 Act, the $1000 ceiling would be worth $1350 by 2001. The BCRA at least acknowledged this reality
and raised the contribution ceiling.
From
a competitive standpoint, does upping contribution limit help incumbents or
challengers more? From an incumbent’s
point of view, with a large number of repeat contributors, you can go back to
them and they’ll probably give double the money all at once. If they maxed out before, now maybe they’ll
max out more. What about
challengers? What might help them about
this? Who else is giving? What’s the blend of contributions here?
Instinctively,
it might help both. Incumbents have
predictable sources like party that will continue to support them. They also have PACs and interest groups. At least some of the time, challengers
actually appreciate and benefit more from the bump up because wealthy
individuals who are more autonomous you might be able to find more and get more
money.
Recent
study: 1996, 1998, 2000 elections found that especially in Senate
non-incumbents more likely to benefit from upping contribution limits. Lots of maxed out contributions
to non-incumbents. Disparity in House too.
The
push for a higher ceiling had come from member who thought they could get
steady contributors to double maximum, but maybe also help challengers, maybe
more than incumbents.
Broader
base to rely on, even for the House, not hitting people as hard or not same
urgency to max out if reluctant as opposed to challengers, for whom must.
Incumbents
raise more than challengers. Percentage of max different
than number of contributions.
Challengers will never equalize.
There
is an endless quest for people who have yet to participate through wallets in
campaigns.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri most noteworthy aspect is
separate concurrences. Stevens argues that money is property not
speech. He’s ready to overrule or
explicitly limit Buckley.
Breyer
and Ginsburg want to protect process and limit money, interests of constitutional
magnitude. Strict scrutiny, therefore,
may not be as appropriate if there are balancing constitutional interests.
Souter is the majority author. He is
skeptical about some aspects of Buckley. In 2001 and 2002, a group emerged prepared to
ask fundamental questions about the Buckley
approach. Rehnquist and O’Connor are not
interested in overturning Buckley. The dissenters actually want to revisit Buckley for a different reason because
they want to ban all limits of both
kinds.
The
distinction is making people uncomfortable because it’s not easy to figure out
how to parse things beyond individual donors.
Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas want to get rid of all contribution limits. They think the Court made a big mistake. Expenditures and contributions should be unlimited,
according to them. They don’t believe
that contributions aren’t speech. This
is a big split in the Court.
The
Chamber of Commerce challenges the law on First Amendment grounds, and the Court
upholds it as constitutional. This is
the first time that the Court upheld a statute regulating corporate
expenditures. What’s going on here?
In Buckley, Court relied on state interest
of prohibiting quid pro quo corruption.
What about state of
Corruption
is mantra justifying limitations. No quid
pro quo here.
The
Court refers to thing called “corrosive and distorting” effect. What is corrosive and distorting if
corporations use general treasury? Handful of people deciding moving money into political process from
economic process.
Distortion! Money
given for profit motive reasons but used for political reasons. Corporations say we don’t spend money except
if we think public policy will affect profit margin. Corporations don’t spend on social issues. Only profit motivated. Kennedy and Scalia claim that the majority has
revitalized the “enhancement theory”, what Buckley
said we won’t do. Majority doesn’t think
it’s doing that.
Not
just economics into political. What else
distortion? If not equalization, what is
Court worried about? Corporations
shouldn’t be allowed to get away with this?
Corporations using state privilege in wrong ways? But piece of this in terms of why the
treasury instead of PAC is inappropriate.
Why is corporate treasury the wrong way to do it? PAC money comes from donors. Individual people. Maybe a corporate culture where midlevel
managers must give to PAC or no promotion, but it’s still individual corporate
actors. There will be disclosure to
public about who donated and how much.
When a corporation ends up spending general treasury money, makes public
think comes from aggregation of individuals, no reflects managers shifting
bundles of money as if lots of small contributions. Instead, investment decision. Shouldn’t be part of
political process. Supposed to
reflect individual knowable actors not lump sum payments from general treasury.
PACs
bundle money from series of individual voices.
If want political playing to be effective, give to
Power of ideas too persua? Public unable to resist? Bottling init? Spending for refund bottles
and bottling manuf spending $1.5 million, public
votes against init. Why? Because they are persuaded? Or because of money? Rationally persuaded? Money? Reasons to vote one way or
another? We vote against it. Is that corruption? Tough question. That’s where equalization and distortion don’t
mesh well.
Appear
of corrupt in Buckley appear votes individ candidates
being quid pro quo bought. Not what this
is about. Kennedy and Scalia are right
that Court is changing direction to some extent. Court says that process can be distorted by
allowing so much wealth to go in that there’s message imbalance. Not trading votes per se, public being duped
due to so much money not adequately reflecting individual actors.
Prepared
to allow corps to continue spending money through PACs and they may have a
modestly disproportionate influence. But
if spend money through treasury, then public will think they get more message
from individual actors instead of agg of wealth
dumped in to conversation in a way that will nec distort. More soph view than votes for money. Disturb dissent, Court understand more
complicated to sift through corrupt here.
We’ve
been dealing so far with how much indivs can
contribute and corps can contributes. Now limits on parties.
Strange case?! So many cases
about parties since then. 20
years after Buckley first time Court deals with limits on poli
parties.
FECA
imposed $5000 limit on multi-candidate poli comm.,
that’s PACs. Or on its
terms as imposing same limit on parties giving to candidates. But pary
expenditure provision creates a general excep from
limit; allow poli par to make gen
election campaign expendit limit either $20,000 or 2
cents time voting age population of state.
Background:
5.15 million in
Demos
complain to election commission: “Already gave away radio ads coord expen because in gen elec and if true, we win and
they can’t do this. They should be fined
prosecuted whatever.”
Lower
courts said: district court says “in connection with” meant ads had to have
express magic words of advocacy: “Vote for Wirth” or “Vote again Wirth”. Can’t say: “Wirth is a crazy liberal”…not
sufficient advocacy for election or defeat of candidate. “Magic words” doctrine.
Court
of Appeals reversed…all had to have was election
message about clearly ident candidate…anti-Wirth ads
were coordinated and exceeded limits, therefore violation. Both district court and Court of Appeals
focused on anti-Wirth. Coord or
independent? What did they care
about? Low courts fight about indepen on basis of attack sufficiently precise to be
express advocacy or defeat, what matters to Breyer?
No candit when starting running ads? Talk to any? FEC presumption…need
evid coordination.
Evid matter that’s what’s going on. Court in the case ducks question
presented. Everybody thought they were decide whether limiting
coordinated expenditures was constitutional.
Independent expenditure? Deny to decide legal question upon which cert was granted. Constitutional? Don’t know yet. Summary judgment? Court says no disputed fact, as a matter of
law we think no disputed facts, on this record, no coordination, so easy case
at least in first form. But we don’t
only see first form.
How
much coord had there been? Had Calloway talked to candidates? Frustration on both sides. Can trace justices
change over years. They’ve been educated
about poli process and changed views based on
corruption much more complicated and law not doing what Congress wanted it to. Who are we to second-guess? Sometimes Court issues a narrow ruling that
avoids making big law.
Helpful case for several reasons. First page and a half restatement of Buckely distinction. Two reasons Court has tradi
said contrib. more scrut than expend restrain on expend curb more express
because each dollar express but dollars of contrib. are not. Corruption with contrib. not
so much expend.
Souter reports that the Buckley court
said something in particular about coord expenditures
as opposed to individual ones. What did Buckley hold about coord
expend? Buckley raised possibility that coord
expend can be viewed as ways to circumvent contrib. limits. If party says give $5,000 and we’ll be the
funnel and send to candidate, expenditure on candid, but looks like passed
through contrib..
Lots of people willing to max out. Do they understand that you’re giving to
representative aller against sen
wirth? All
money go to candidate?
Understood? Tension! We’ll look at that.
Two
major things: ban on soft money and electioneering ads. Concentrate on those. McConnell tomorrow.
Important new law.