Property
Class Notes
License
This
is a privilege to use the land of another.
It’s not an interest in property, and it is revocable at will (this is a
key distinguishing factor of this servitude).
It may be granted pursuant to a contract. It’s also not subject to the statute of
frauds.
Easement
There’s
a Restatement definition, but it doesn’t help us very much. It’s not subject to the will of the possessor
of the land. It can be created by
conveyance or grant. The essential
attribute of an affirmative easement is that it gives the holder of the
easement the right to use the land of another by going onto that land for some
limited purpose. It’s not an estate in
land because it will never become possessory.
It doesn’t give you the right to possess land in the typical sense.
Easements
are classified in a variety of ways: they can be affirmative or negative. They can be appurtenant—meaning that the
benefit of the easement benefits a person in his capacity as a landowner—or in
gross, meaning that the easement benefits someone without respect to any land.
An
example of an easement appurtenant is a right of way. You might give a neighbor a right of way in
order to travel to a public highway.
That’s of no use to the holder of the easement except as a landowner. If that person sells the property, the
easement will go to the next landowner.
An
example of an easement in gross would be a conservation easement. You might grant an easement to a conservation
society that doesn’t own land, but just doesn’t want certain land
developed. This is also the case with
utility companies. The telephone company
wants to run wires across your land not for the benefit of any other tract of
land, but rather to provide phone service to you and all your neighbors.
The
other thing to say about easements in gross and easements appurtenant is that
we’re taking about the benefit of the
easement. The burden of the easement is always
appurtenant.
The
easement requires a dominant and a servient estate. You must have both in order to have an
easement (though there is such a thing as a “quasi-easement”). The dominant estate is benefited, and the
servient estate is burdened by the easement.
So
far, we have been talking about affirmative easements. They are so called because the owner of the
dominant estate has the right to make some use
of the servient estate and perform some act on that land. But you can also have negative easements that
restrict what the owner of the estate can do with his own land. There are really
only four of them: (1) light, (2) air, (3) water, (4) subjacent and lateral
support. You have the right to receive
sunlight from across your neighbor’s land (“ancient lights”). So a negative easement could be where your
neighbor would agree to restrict the height of vegetation or buildings in order
to preserve the right to light, air, or water.
The last one is an agreement by which they promise not to excavate so
close to the boundary line of the property such that the adjacent land would
collapse. These were the only four negative easements. If it’s not one of these things, it must be a
real covenant. That’s why we have to
learn all five of these servitudes.
Creation of easements
For
the next couple of classes, we’ll talk about the creation of easements. Easements can be created by an express
conveyance or a grant. They constitute
an interest in land and thus fall into the statute of frauds (with some
exceptions). Usually, with the statute
of frauds it says that certain types of instruments must be signed by the party
to be charged. That is not necessarily
the case with easements. They may be
signed by the owner of the servient estate, but they may not be. If the dominant
party is giving something to the servient party but reserving an easement for
himself, at common law the servient party doesn’t have to sign.
Williard v.
First Church of Christ, Scientist,
The
facts are a little tricky. Petersen is a
real estate agent. Petersen agrees to
sell two lots to Willard even though Petersen doesn’t own both lots. That might be underhanded, or it might have
been understood by both parties that Petersen would try to get the other lot as
a condition for closing the deal. McGuigan
sells lot 19 to Petersen. Petersen contracts
to sell lots 19 and 20 to Williard. McGuigan
sells lot 20 to Petersen but reserves an easement in favor of the church for
parking purposes. Then Petersen closes
the deal with Willard for both lots. Basically
Willard claims to have taken the land free of the easement.
When
does the easement end? It ends when the
church property is no longer used as a church.
It’s an easement determinable!
Which
estate is dominant and which is servient? The dominant estate is the church, and the
servient estate is the church. Who gets
the benefit of the easement? The church
does. The servient estate is the one
with the burden. That’s Willard. The easement is appurtenant to the church
because it makes the church’s land better suited for the congregation. This means two things: any subsequent church
user of the land will be entitled to the benefit of the easement. Also, if the church moves away to any other
parcel so that it can no longer benefit from the easement, it will lose the
easement. This easement is part of this one particular parcel of land.
If
something other than a church is established on the church land, then the
easement will end.
What’s
the litigation about? Why does Willard
claim that the easement is invalid?
At common
law, courts find exceptions and repeal a rule piecemeal. After a while, the exceptions build up and
the court decides to state that the rule no longer exists. This is only the rule in
So
one way to make this work would be to grant the easement to the church then
sell the land to Willard and except the easement from the warranties of the
deed. Why not sell
The
court is going to get rid of the rule, but many people may have relied on this rule. The court says that if someone can show that
they relied on the old rule, then it will only be applied prospectively. The court finds that Willard didn’t pay
attention to the deed and didn’t rely on the old rule. Therefore, the court finds for the church. Is the court just being hard on Willard and
Petersen? There’s no way to know from
these facts. The court seems to have a
lot of sympathy for McGuigan and the church, plus they think it’s a really bad
rule.
When
you except something, you’re carving it out of the coverage of your warranty. You can convey land “with full warranty except…”
A reservation, on the other hand, is a way of creating an interest in yourself (or, after Willard, a third party).
Cordwell v.
Smith
The
facts are incredibly complicated. Cordwell owns some land that’s high up and
snowy and mountainous. It’s close to an
interstate, but you have to take the
Easement
from preexisting, apparent, and continuous use is basically a contract
doctrine. You start out with unity of title
and then you have subsequent severance.
You have one big tract of land, and prior to the severance or division
of the property into two parcels, it was used the way that the defendant wants
to continue to use it (an apparent continuous use). If the owner of the whole big thing used a
road to go between what would later be the two halves, then you have this
apparent continuous use. You also must
show that the easement is reasonably
necessary. If this is the case, then
you impute to the grantor and grantee the assumption that the use would
continue because it was important. It
must be important because we don’t want to restrict property for trivial
things. But if it significantly affects
the value of the property, then it is reasonable to assume that when the
parties bargained, they assumed that the easement would continue.
The
court says that the defendants lose. The
court says that for some defendants, there was no unity of ownership. As to the rest of the defendants, the court
finds that the road had been used as a logging road and there was nothing to
indicate that the roads were to be used after the logging ceased. There was no apparent continuous use. Therefore, the court doesn’t need to get to
the third issue of whether the road was reasonably necessary. It probably
was, but the court doesn’t have to get to it.